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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 We confront, once again, a problem which no court, 
trial or appellate, should have to face in this circuit. Although 
we have unequivocally required since 1977 that government agents 
preserve rough notes of interviews with prospective trial 
witnesses, see United States v. Vella, 562 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 
1977) (per curiam), this case presents yet another instance in 
which notes were destroyed.  We do not reverse here because it is 
 apparent to us that the destroyed notes did not constitute Jencks 
Act1 or Brady2 material and that the officers who destroyed them 
acted in good faith.  Nonetheless, we take this opportunity to 
emphasize that the fortuitous mix of legal and factual 
circumstances which might excuse the destruction of notes, and 
thus constrain us to leave a conviction undisturbed, are few and 
far between.  We should not encounter such cases in the future. 
I. 
 Appellants Maria and Elizabeth Ramos, mother and 
daughter, were convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 
cocaine base, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and 
related charges arising out of their involvement in a 
family-operated drug ring.  The original indictment targeting the 
Ramos family conspiracy charged 39 defendants, including three of 
Maria Ramos's sons, with various drug distribution and possession 
charges.  The majority of those charged began to cooperate, and a 
superseding indictment followed.  Maria Ramos and Elizabeth Ramos 
were first charged in the superseding indictment. 
 At trial, the government's case against the Ramoses was 
supported by the testimony of 13 co-conspirators who cooperated 
pursuant to plea agreements.  The government agrees that "the 
testimony of co-conspirators was the cornerstone of the evidence 
against the defendants."  Government's brief at 12 n.2. 
 Detective James Moffit and his partner, Sergeant Gerald 
Logan, interviewed the cooperating witnesses and took notes 
                                                           
1
 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 
2
 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 during their initial debriefings, or "proffers," in late 1990 or 
early 1991.  Both were long-time Philadelphia police officers who 
began working with the federal government on this investigation 
in the fall of 1989 in association with the federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration ("DEA").  Logan described himself as 
being "assigned" to the DEA; Moffit termed his position as one in 
which he was "detailed" or "cross-designated" to the DEA.  App. 
at 1060, 1277, 2263.  Both had been "sworn in" by the DEA and 
were issued DEA credentials.  See app. at 1278. 
 It is undisputed that Moffit and, apparently, Logan3 
destroyed their notes after they prepared summary reports 
("DEA-6s").  Appellants contend that this destruction mandated 
suppression of the officers' testimony or a mistrial, both of 
which the district court denied.  (Elizabeth Ramos had moved for 
production of the notes prior to trial, while Maria Ramos first 
raised the issue of the destruction of the notes during Moffit's 
cross-examination at trial; it was her counsel who initially 
moved for a mistrial and for suppression of Moffit's testimony. 
See generally app. at 1285-96.) 
                                                           
3Though not disputed, whether both officers or only Moffit 
destroyed notes remains unclear.  Appellants focus on 
Moffit, but the government speaks in the plural, discussing 
the "officers' destruction of notes."  Because both Moffit 
and Logan took notes, we will presume for purposes of this 
appeal that they were both involved in or at least aware of 
their destruction.  The issue becomes material only when 
discussing their prior training, a point at which both 
appellants and the government seem content to rest on a 
discussion of Moffit's experience in any event.  See infra 
note 7. 
  The district court exercised jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we do so pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  To the extent appellants contend that the 
government's actions violated the rule set forth in Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), we review the district court's 
legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear 
error.  United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 
1993); United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 1992). 
We review the district court's denial of the appellants' motion 
based on a claim of Jencks error for abuse of discretion.  Hill, 
976 F.2d at 139.4 
II. 
 Criminal pretrial discovery is, of course, vastly 
different from discovery in civil cases.  In contrast to the 
wide-ranging discovery permitted in civil cases, Rule 16 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure delineates the categories of 
information to which defendants are entitled in pretrial 
discovery in criminal cases, with some additional material being 
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 In addition to the destruction of notes issue, appellants 
contend that their trial was marred by impermissible 
vouching because the government (1) referred to the 
truthfulness provisions of the cooperating witnesses' plea 
agreements, (2) elicited certain testimony from Moffit about 
accomplices who had not testified and referred to those 
persons in its closing argument, and (3) referred to non-
testifying family members in its closing argument.  The 
Ramoses also argue that in describing the plea agreements 
during its charge to the jury, the trial court improperly 
instructed that "it is up to the government to decide 
whether the defendant has cooperated and provided truthful 
information," thus buttressing the government's effort to 
bolster those witnesses' credibility.  We find no merit to 
these contentions. 
 discoverable in accordance with statutory pronouncements and the 
due process clause of the Constitution.  The Jencks Act requires 
that after each government witness has testified on direct 
examination, the government must produce to the defense "any 
statement" made by the witness which relates to his or her 
testimony.  In Brady, the Supreme Court held that due process 
required that the government produce all "exculpatory" evidence, 
which includes both "[m]aterials . . . that go to the heart of 
the defendant's guilt or innocence and materials that might 
affect the jury's judgment of the credibility of a crucial 
prosecution witness."  United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 
134-35 (3d Cir. 1992).  See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150, 154 (1972); United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (citing Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) ("[a] 
valid Brady complaint contains three elements:  (1) the 
prosecution must suppress or withhold evidence, (2) which is 
favorable, and (3) material to the defense")).  See generally 
United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 In United States v. Vella, 562 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(per curiam), we held that "the rough interview notes of F.B.I. 
agents should be kept and produced so that the trial court can 
determine whether the notes should be made available to the 
[defendant] under the rule of Brady . . . or the Jencks Act." 
Vella, 562 F.2d at 276.  See also United States v. Ammar, 714 
F.2d 238, 259 (3d Cir. 1983) (extending rule to require 
preservation of rough drafts of agents' reports); United States 
v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
 Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  Since then, the 
DEA has apparently adopted an internal policy requiring such 
retention.  See government's brief at 34.  But we need not decide 
whether our holding in Vella or the DEA's policy was followed in 
this case; there is simply no question that they were not. 
Instead, the only question before us is:  what should be done 
about a clear failure to follow established rules and policy? 
 In Vella and Ammar, we explained the requirement for 
retaining rough notes of interviews in such unambiguous terms 
that it would be futile to try to elucidate further here, for 
what we meant cannot be stated more clearly.  See Ammar, 714 F.2d 
at 259 ("the government must retain and, upon motion, make 
available to the district court both the rough notes and the 
drafts of reports of its agents to facilitate the district 
court's determination whether they should be produced"); Vella, 
562 F.2d at 276 ("rough interview notes should be kept and 
produced").  Though we did not address the point directly, 
arguably a case could be made that the unequivocal tone of our 
decisions in these cases implied that we would reverse a 
conviction where the government failed to abide its 
responsibility (indeed, its legal obligation), no matter what 
factors might have contributed to the destruction of notes or 
drafts of reports.  Cf. United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217 
(9th Cir. 1977) (violation of Harris rule "might arguably" have 
required reversal but for court's decision not to apply it 
retroactively).  We have not previously stated explicitly whether 
 our holding in Vella established a per se rule or one which is 
subject to a "good faith exception" or harmless error analysis. 
 A careful reading of both Vella and Ammar, however, 
suggests that we did not imply a rule which would automatically 
preclude evidence based upon destroyed rough notes, without 
regard for other considerations.  In Vella, without elaboration, 
we stated that "in light of the other evidence in the record, as 
well as the apparent good faith administrative decision which led 
to the destruction of the notes, the error must be considered 
harmless."  Vella, 562 F.2d at 276.  Similarly, in Ammar, we 
refused to find an alleged Jencks Act violation in the 
destruction of rough drafts because (1) the handwritten drafts 
had not been shown to the agent's supervisor for adoption or 
approval, and (2) the agent had testified that the rough drafts 
and final reports were "substantially identical," so that even if 
the drafts were Jencks Act material their destruction was 
harmless.  Ammar, 714 F.2d at 259-60.  We see no reason not to 
undertake a similar analysis in this case; the mere fact that 
Vella and Ammar each established rules for the government to 
follow does not suggest that we intended the automatic 
suppression of evidence when those rules are violated. 
 Our decision is informed by Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 
U.S. 51 (1988), a case in which the Arizona police had failed to 
preserve semen samples from the body and clothing of a victim of 
a sexual assault.  The defendant contended that the failure to 
preserve the evidence had deprived him of due process.  The 
Supreme Court disagreed.  It concluded that although Brady "makes 
 the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when [it] fails to 
disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence[,] the 
due process clause requires a different result when we deal with 
the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of 
which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected 
to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the 
defendant."  Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.  Thus, "unless a 
criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, 
failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not 
constitute a denial of due process of law."  Id. at 58.  See also 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (police officers' 
failure to preserve breath samples which had been subjected to 
Intoxilyzer testing did not violate the Constitution when (1) the 
officers were acting "in good faith and in accord with their 
normal practice," (2) the chances that preserved samples would 
have been exculpatory were "extremely low," and (3) the 
defendants had other means of challenging the Intoxilyzer 
results); United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 199-201 (3d Cir. 
1993) (district court did not err in relying on the government's 
evidence of the weight of marijuana plants in sentencing 
defendant despite the government's destruction of the plants 
without producing them to the defendant); United States v. 
Barton, 995 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1993) (government's negligent 
destruction of marijuana plants which possibly could have 
disproved agents' statement in affidavit of probable cause held 
not violative of due process absent a showing of bad faith on the 
agents' part). 
  Youngblood and Trombetta indicate that we should apply 
a "good faith" test to destruction of evidence.  In this case, 
since the appellants raised Brady and Jencks Act issues, we will 
first proceed to analyze whether either Brady or Jencks Act 
material might have been present in the destroyed notes.  Only 
after ascertaining that it was not present will we move on to a 
good faith analysis.5 
 
A. 
 We may quickly dispose of the Jencks Act issues.  The 
Jencks Act requires a court, upon motion of the defendant and 
after direct examination of a government witness, to order the 
United States to produce to the defense "any statement . . . of 
the witness in [its] possession . . . which relates to the 
subject matter as to which the witness has testified."  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3500(b).  Leaving aside "statements" which are transcriptions 
or recordings of grand jury testimony, a "statement" within the 
meaning of the Jencks Act is: 
 (1) a written statement made by said 
witness and signed or otherwise adopted or 
approved by him; [or] 
 
 (2) a stenographic, mechanical, 
electrical, or other recording, or a 
transcription thereof, which is a 
substantially verbatim recital of an oral 
statement made by said witness and recorded 
                                                           
5
 In one respect, the issue we address here is both simple and 
benign, for, as we discuss below, there is neither a 
reasonable possibility of the destroyed notes having 
contained Jencks Act or Brady material nor a scintilla of 
evidence tending to show that the destruction occurred in 
bad faith. 
 contemporaneously with making of such oral 
statement. 
18 U.S.C. § 3500(e). 
 The destroyed rough notes fall into neither of these 
categories.  They clearly do not constitute "statements" of the 
cooperating co-conspirators, for they are neither "substantially 
verbatim recitals" of what those witnesses said during their 
proffers nor writings which they signed or otherwise adopted or 
approved.6  United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1104-05 (3d 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 
1984); cf. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 350 (1959) (it 
would be "grossly unfair" to permit defendants to attempt to 
impeach witnesses with statements "which could not fairly be said 
to be the witness' [sic] own rather than the product of the 
investigator's selections, interpretations and interpolations"). 
See United States v. Foley, 871 F.2d 235, 238-39 (1st Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Ricks, 817 F.2d 692, 698 (11th Cir. 1987).  Nor 
are they "statements" of Moffit or Logan, for they are by no 
means "substantially verbatim" recitals of anything Moffit or 
Logan said.  Further, unlike the DEA-6s themselves, they do not 
constitute writings which the officers later adopted in any way. 
See United States v. Griffin, 659 F.2d 932, 937-38 (9th Cir. 
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 See app. at 392-93, 570, 803, 1048-49, 1069, 1081, 1083, 
1491, 1530-31, 1633 (testimony of Moffit and various 
witnesses testifying pursuant to plea agreements).  We may 
rely on such secondary evidence in determining whether 
missing or destroyed notes contained Jencks Act material. 
See United States v. Cole, 634 F.2d 866, 869 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(per curiam). 
 1981).  Accordingly, we conclude that the destroyed notes did not 
constitute Jencks Act material. 
B. 
 The Brady issue is more complex.  In Vella, we relied 
on United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975), in 
requiring preservation of rough notes.  The Harrison court 
explained: 
 It seems too plain for argument that 
rough notes from any witness interview could 
prove to be Brady material.  Whether or not 
the prosecution uses the witness at trial, 
the notes could contain substantive 
information or leads which would be of use to 
the defendants on the merits of the case.  If 
the witness does testify, the notes might 
reveal a discrepancy between his testimony on 
the stand and his story at a time when the 
events were fresh in his mind.  The 
discrepancy would obviously be important to 
use in impeaching the witness' [sic] 
credibility.  The possible importance of the 
rough notes for these purposes is not 
diminished in cases where the prosecutor 
turns over to the defense the . . . reports. 
The . . . reports contain the agent's 
narrative account of the witness's statement, 
prepared partly from the rough notes and 
partly from the agent's recollection of the 
interview.  Although the agents are trained 
to include all the pertinent information in 
the . . . report, there is clearly room for 
misunderstanding or outright error whenever 
there is a transfer of information in this 
manner.  In the best of good faith, the 
statement . . . may, to some degree at least, 
reflect the input of the agent.  In such a 
situation, the information contained in the 
rough notes taken from the witness himself 
might be more credible and more favorable to 
the defendant's position. 
Id. at 427-28 (footnote omitted).  If, as some believe, our 
ability to know something is largely determined by that to which 
 we have been exposed and by the varying capacities of our sensory 
perception and reasoning skills, then Harrison essentially states 
the obvious:  it is impossible to know for certain whether or not 
rough notes which have been destroyed would have been 
exculpatory, or whether their exculpatory nature would have been 
apparent to the agents at the time of the destruction, because 
they are no longer here for us to see, to analyze, to interpret. 
Whatever truths might have been gleaned from them, and whatever 
contributions these truths might have offered to the doing of 
justice, were destroyed along with the notes themselves.  Thus, 
if the evil sought to be eliminated by requiring preservation of 
notes was the uncertainty about whether the notes would have 
contained Brady material, then excusing their destruction as long 
as it was done in good faith would seem to undercut both the rule 
and its purpose.  It is difficult to imagine, for example, how a 
court could determine whether the exculpatory nature of an 
agent's notes would have been apparent to the agent before 
destruction without first reviewing the notes.  Similarly, 
without knowing what inconsistencies, if any, the notes 
contained, a court will undoubtedly find it difficult (if not 
impossible) to decide whether the defendant seeking production 
had other opportunities to make the same arguments he or she 
could have made with the notes. 
 Nevertheless, the mere possibility that the destroyed 
notes might have included Brady material, without more, is 
insufficient to implicate such concerns.  We think it unwise to 
infer the existence of Brady material based upon speculation 
 alone.  Instead, we favor the approach taken by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Griffin, that "unless 
[a] defendant is able to raise at least a colorable claim that 
the investigator's discarded rough notes contained evidence 
favorable to [him] and material to his claim of innocence or to 
the applicable punishment -- and that such exculpatory evidence 
has not been included in any formal interview report provided to 
defendant -- no constitutional error of violation of due process 
will have been established."  Griffin, 659 F.2d at 939.  At the 
risk of pushing understatement to the brink of rationality, we 
acknowledge, as did the court in Griffin, that attempting to make 
such a showing by examining the agents and interviewees or using 
other documentary evidence is "not as ideal" as examination of 
the notes themselves would be.  To conclude otherwise, however, 
would be to read Brady too broadly, requiring "the government to 
preserve all material even arguably related to the criminal 
transaction."  Id. at 939 & n.7. 
 In this case the defendants have offered nothing beyond 
their speculation that the agents' notes might have contained 
Brady material.  In response, the government indicated that 
Moffit had incorporated everything contained within the notes 
into the DEA-6s.  App. at 1448, 1452.  Cf. app. at 1282.  There 
was no suggestion by anyone in a position to know (that is, the 
witnesses or the officers) that the DEA-6s differed in any way 
from the oral proffers that would have been reflected in the 
destroyed notes.  Further, at trial the district court examined 
all the notes that had been preserved from later witness proffers 
 and ordered production of about 20 pages.  These pages did not 
reveal any Brady material and defense counsel chose not even to 
cross-examine Moffit with regard to them.  (While we draw no firm 
conclusion here, this at least tends to indicate that the chances 
of damaging material existing in the destroyed notes were 
somewhat remote, assuming the officers were consistent 
throughout, both in their method and practice of transcribing 
their written notes.)  Appellants have not raised a colorable 
claim that the destroyed notes contained exculpatory material 
that was material to their defense and was not included within 
the DEA-6s.  Therefore, we conclude that the destruction of the 
notes did not constitute a Brady violation.  Cf. United States v. 
Michaels, 796 F.2d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 202 
(3d Cir. 1970) (both holding that defendants' mere speculation 
that Brady material might be present is insufficient to permit 
perusal of government files). 
 C. 
 It is undisputed that Moffit and Logan destroyed their 
notes in good faith.  They are Philadelphia police officers, not 
DEA agents, and Moffit testified that the federal practice of 
retaining records of a cooperating-witness interview is 
"completely different" from the Philadelphia police department's. 
App. at 1065-66.  In the Philadelphia police department, at least 
at the time the events with which we are concerned took place, 
the officers "consider [notes] sensitive material" that they 
"don't leave . . . around at all."  Id. at 1106.  Philadelphia 
police officers retain the reports they draft based upon their 
notes but destroy the notes.  Id. at 1108-09. 
 Moreover, Moffit received no special training and no 
orientation for his work with the DEA.  App. at 1278.7  He was 
instructed as to the "general mechanics" of DEA-6s but was not 
told to preserve the notes he used in compiling the DEA-6s.  Id. 
at 1280-83, 1285.  Moffit testified that he believed he was 
following office procedure because he saw others destroying 
notes.  Id. at 1283. 
 We are well aware of the critical contribution the DEA 
and its agents make to the national effort to control illegal 
drug trafficking and to combat illegal drug use.  Indeed, we have 
not lost sight of the fact that the issue before us is derived 
                                                           
7The initial Ramos indictment was the first federal indictment 
Moffit had assisted in procuring.  App. at 1064. As noted 
previously, both appellants and the government have 
generally relied on Moffit's testimony regarding the 
training he received as representing the training both 
officers received.  See supra note 3. 
 precisely from that laudable and important campaign.  But we 
cannot approve of the way in which Moffit and, presumably, Logan 
were trained.  It is regrettable that the DEA failed to instruct 
officers affiliated with it to preserve the rough notes taken at 
proffer sessions, particularly after we have made it abundantly 
clear that it is required to do so and its own internal 
guidelines mandate that it do so.  Our affirmance in this case is 
in no way intended to encourage or to permit lax compliance with 
the dictates of due process under the guise of good-faith 
ignorance.  To the contrary, we expect more of the government. 
And if there were evidence indicating a deliberate or, under 
circumstances not present here, even a negligent contravention of 
the Vella rule, we would very likely reach a different 
conclusion. 
 As we have noted, however, in this case it seems clear 
that the officers (who, significantly, were only loosely 
connected to the DEA) were entirely unaware that they should 
preserve their notes, and that their past experience indicated 
that they were to destroy them.  The defense has produced no 
evidence to the contrary, relying instead on speculation and the 
argument that contravention of the Vella rule automatically 
constitutes bad faith.  See E. Ramos's brief at 18-23.  We cannot 
rest our decision in this case on such conclusory allegations, 
and for the reasons discussed above, we decline the invitation to 
fashion a per se rule in this area. 
III. 
  In conclusion, because the destroyed notes did not 
constitute Jencks Act materials, there is nothing beyond 
speculation to indicate that they contained Brady material, and 
the officers clearly acted in good faith in destroying them, we 
will affirm the district court's denial of appellants' motion for 
suppression or, in the alternative, a mistrial.  The judgment of 
conviction is affirmed. 
 
